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ministration may be made to see after the election.

I should appreciate it if you would be good enough to send me the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of yesterday's debate as well as your own speeches on the Vietnam issue during the last week.

May I recall by way of personal introduction that I met you when I was teaching at Columbia.

Yours gratefully and respectfully,
ERNEST DALE,
Professor, the University of Virginia.

VALLEJO, CALIF.,
August 4, 1964.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senator from Oregon,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

SIR: In the April 6 issue of I. F. Stone's Weekly a section is abridged from your March 25 speech in the Senate on South Vietnam.

The Weekly states in its abridgement: "We are there we say at the invitation of the South Vietnamese Government. But that Government is our own creature. We know it and the world knows it. One might as well try to claim that the Soviet Army is in East Germany only at the invitation of the East German Government."

It continues further on in the article: "There are no Chinese soldiers fighting in Vietnam; there are no Russian soldiers. The only foreign troops are Americans. Every time an American dies in Vietnam, the flag should be lowered to half mast over the Capitol, over the White House, over the Pentagon because boys are dying in the execution of a unilateral policy that no longer has a direct bearing on the defenses of the United States."

If this is the correct sense of your Senate speech, it is a severe indictment of U.S. action in South Vietnam.

I. F. Stone, himself, speaking on KPFA radio (a listerner-supported radio station in Berkeley, Calif.) stated that news corresponds from other countries covering South Vietnam found that of all the arms recovered from the Vietcong, a vast majority were United States made and only a small proportion were made in Communist China. If this is so, it makes talk of taking the war north irrelevant if not dangerous. The above-noted observation indicates further, I think, that the fighting is a revolution internal to South Vietnam; the U.S. arms were stolen by the Vietcong from South Vietnam.

Statements such as the above, by responsible citizens such as you and Mr. Stone, have raised grave doubts in my mind as to the justice of U.S. actions in South Vietnam. Doubtful though I may be and respectful of your opinions, sir, I find myself with a scarcity of facts to substantiate criticism of the administration's present course of action.

I would very much appreciate it if your office would send me a statement of your own on the South Vietnam action and of what are the true U.S. interests in the area. In addition, I would like a catalog of the hard facts (along with independent sources) by which you document your view and the reasoning behind it.

If I find the documentation adequate, I will be glad to join you "out on (your) limb" and, in my small capacity as a citizen, I will help you in any way I can.

Very truly yours,

JOHN P. WEBBER.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,
August 8, 1964.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I should like first of all to express my gratitude and admiration for the courageous stand you have con-

sistently taken against the aggressive foreign policies of this country. How it is that you are virtually the sole person in the Senate who has not made himself a stooge for the Military Establishment and the business community I do not know, but your lone dissent has my full support.

I am a student at the Harvard Graduate School in the field of Soviet studies. I am planning to do an analytic and interpretative study of U.S. policy in Vietnam, and I shall endeavor to place this in the full historical context of American policy in Asia. Since, however, my major objective is to elucidate the real nature of what is going on in that part of the world today and what is likely to happen in the near future, I am very much concerned with the serious difficulties which one faces in obtaining reliable information. The recent crisis was enormously frustrating to one who refuses to accept the veracity of official Government statements and explanations.

Since the American Government has quite consistently and deliberately lied to the American people with regard to matters concerning Indochina, and since you alone have sought to counter this deception, it seemed useful for me to find out if you could provide me with any information. Your membership on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and your deep concern with developments in Indochina have no doubt made you one of the best informed persons in these matters.

I should like to know, therefore, if there is any information which you could send me and which it would be permissible for me to quote, including any specific remarks which you yourself might care to make. I am particularly interested in the extent to which the United States and our South Vietnamese puppets have been carrying out air attacks, dropping sabotage teams, supporting naval attacks, etc., on North Vietnamese territory. Also, do you have official information relevant to the myth of North Vietnamese and Chinese aggression, infiltration, and supplying of arms and men? I have followed most, if not all, of your remarks which have found their way into the newspapers, including more sympathetic publications, such as I. F. Stone's Weekly.

Thank you very much for whatever additional information with which you can provide me, and thank you again for your voice of dissent against the increasingly dangerous policies of the American Government.

Sincerely,

STEVEN J. ROSENTHAL.

COSTA MESA, CALIF.,
August 7, 1964.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senator,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: You are certainly to be congratulated on your splendid stand for right as you have drawn so clearly the picture of the southeast Asian problem.

The people (meaning the man or woman on the street) are not well informed with regard to most of today's crisis situations. Nor are we thoroughly informed as to your position. But, it is the thought of some of us that you have objected to the military giveaway—the interference on our part in a war that we cannot win, etc.

Many of us feel that the whole of southeast Asia should be neutralized and that the U.N. should have a firm hand. We hope for the reconvening of the Geneva Conference. We feel that the policy started by Dulles and carried on in support of the corrupt Diem regime was totally bankrupt, and we feel the same way about Khan. We deplore the strategic hamlets, the abuse of the people, and the no-win, wasteful situation, as we see it.

You may not agree at all, but De Gaulle has, to the way of many people's thinking,

offered some ideas worth considering but there.

More than all else, today, we believe that U Thant is the wise one. We believe that you and Senator GRENING have taken a less warlike position, and we feel that a third world war is the destruction of civilization. We deplore the quick money for arms and feel that negotiation—use of the U.N., etc.—are the wise moves. Walter Lippmann always stands tall.

On foreign aid, many of us would see technical help, an expansion of the Peace Corps. In place of the military (except for genuine internal security), we would see schools, hospitals, roads, dams, help to the people. That would be a "win" policy, whether done at home or abroad.

Mr. MORSE, will you please send a dozen of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD sheets, showing your position, that I may put them in the hands of responsible people?

Thank you,

ANGINNETTE SHERMAN GORES.

RIALTO, CALIF.,

August 5, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR: I always used to impress with your views, because regardless of party affiliations, all other needs of conformity, I think you are one of those who says what he thinks.

It is impossible to get full text of your speech on Vietnam, which must include lot of facts press and TV decline to tell or print.

If possible I like to have full text of your speech on Vietnam you gave on August 5.

Because of my knowledge of history of Vietnam since 15th century and United States, French, and Vietnamese relations before Dienbienphu and since I see not much moral base on U.S. arguments about independence of South Vietnam.

U.S. position in South Vietnam as similar to those Russian position in Hungry.

United States paid \$2.7 billion to French to kill Vietnamese when their only crime was to fight to kick French out of their country, yet United States did not mind to give Ho Chi Minh and Pathet Lao when they were fighting against Japanese.

After World War II over, despite of those loose talk about Four Freedoms, Atlantic Charter and all those freedom nonsense French did not mind to grab those lands back, with approval of United States of course.

Before Bao Dai and after moral position of United States was vulnerable at Vietnam, especially unkept parts of Geneva agreement on Vietnam, when United States stayed out, after Mendes France said put up or shut up to Dulles, when they were beaten at Dien Bien Phu by Pathet Lao and Ho Chi Minh and Wo Nguyen Giap.

It is nice to see that there are men like you still existing, when heads are hot, it takes guts to criticize oneself.

Sincerely,

HALIL S. GURELLI,
Turkish Student.

BROOKLYN, N.Y.,

August 6, 1964.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: This is to confirm today's telegram wishing you courage in the continuing fight against our policy in Vietnam which inevitably leads to war.

Enclosed, too, are copies of wires I have sent to my two Senators.

It would be helpful to me in talking with friends and neighbors to have any available copies of transcripts of the talks you have been making on this question. Truthfully, I had given but passing attention to the inconspicuous newspaper reports of your speeches. But shocked as I was by the President's message on Tuesday night, and the

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Subsequent developments, I was overjoyed when I saw and heard you on TV this morning. It bolstered my hope and my determination to see that you are there and still fighting in the face of this veritable landslide of war incitement.

Keep up the good fight. I am sure there are many like myself who want to help in any small way we can.

Sincerely,

CLARA COLÓN.

BROOKLYN, N.Y.
August 8, 1964.

President LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR PRESIDENT JOHNSON: It is not my custom to dash off letters to public officials at the drop of a hat. But since hearing your message to us fellow Americans last Tuesday night, I have not had a moment's peace of mind. When you said that our planes at that moment were in action, I shuddered remembering the nightmare of the Korean war behind us and aghast at the possibility of nuclear war ahead of us. As every passing hour brings new efforts through radio, TV, and the papers to raise a war fever, I am increasingly alarmed. I could not go to work this morning before writing to you.

If we are indeed a country whose Government exercises power by consent of the governed, I must in good conscience raise my small voice to declare I do not consent to your message of Tuesday night, nor your speech at Syracuse, nor Ambassador Stevenson's presentation at the U.N. Security Council yesterday, nor the joint resolution being debated in Congress today. And I have so wired to my Senators.

Without any hesitation I am ready to make every sacrifice for the genuine defense of my country. But I am convinced that my country is in no way threatened by North Vietnam's PT boats in the Gulf of Tonkin. At this moment, incited by publicity, many people may be horrified by an "unprovoked" attack upon our destroyers. But these same people, if furnished more information and given a chance to really judge, would probably join me in asking, "What are our destroyers doing there in the first place?" Why have we let our Government get into the business of upholding one corrupt and shaky regime after another, none of which have enjoyed the confidence of its own people? Wasn't the experience of France, and its inevitable debacle at Dien Bien Phu lesson enough for us? Do we have to step into France's outworn colonialist shoes? And at what cost to us taxpayers?

You seemed to take pride and comfort, Mr. President, in the fact that Senator BARRY GOLDWATER supports your conduct in the Vietnam situation. I am frankly shocked. It was bad enough to see a candidate of Senator Goldwater's extremist views nominated by a major political party, but at least we had the alternative of supporting a mature, forward-looking, thoughtful, reasoning leader in the other party. Do you not realize there is no statesmanship in capitulating to Senator Goldwater's brinkmanship?

Let me refer again to the astronomical cost of our Vietnam policy. How can we keep on spending billions in support of a dubious "freedom" in Vietnam (which the majority of people in Vietnam reject) at the cost of building the foundation for real freedom for the Negro 20 percent of our citizens here at home? Just imagine what effective application could be given to both the civil rights law and the antipoverty program if the funds now used for a false defense of freedom in Vietnam were allocated to a real defense of freedom at home in the form of job opportunities, job training, quality education in integrated schools, slum clearance and new low-rent housing. This would be of tremendous benefit not

only to the underprivileged of all races but to the whole population, and especially to the Negro people as well as the Puerto Rican and Mexican-American minorities.

President Johnson, many of your fellow citizens hope you will have the courage and the bigness to recognize the error of your policy on Vietnam (which is a result of the unfortunate policies you inherited from previous administrations) and will withdraw the joint resolution, pull out our Armed Forces from that area and give the people of Vietnam the liberty to solve their own problems in their own way.

Respectfully and sincerely,

CLARA COLÓN.

AUGUST 6, 1964.

Senator JACOB K. JAVITS,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

For sake of peace please vote against resolution giving President power to declare instant war.

CLARA COLÓN.

BROOKLYN, N.Y.

AUGUST 6, 1964.

Senator KENNETH B. KEATING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

To preserve peace urge vote against resolution tantamount declaration of war.

CLARA COLÓN.

BROOKLYN, N.Y.

CHICAGO, ILL.
August 5, 1964.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: It takes guts to take the stand you did on the NBC program this evening. Your courage and integrity in pointing out our violations of the Geneva agreement are exemplary. We have read an abridged version of your speech to the Senate on June 29. Please send us a copy of the entire speech. We heartily concur in your statement, "Before any administration threatens to take the United States into war it should exhaust the last possibility to avoid it." We can hardly believe that bombing bases in North Vietnam fits into this possibility. Apparently we have learned nothing from the disaster that befell the French in Indochina, and by escalating the war we may all of us "pay the uttermost farthing."

Cordially,

Dr. and Mrs. ALFRED STEIN.

EVANSTON COLLEGE,
Evanston, Ind.
August 6, 1964.

Hon. WAYNE C. MORSE,
Senator from Oregon,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Congratulations upon your forthright affirmation of sound moral truth in the midst of the belligerent nationalistic spirit of the day.

The radio and television reports have given only partial extracts of what you said, however, but by putting together what each of the three networks quoted I suppose we have a fair representation of what you really said.

If it is possible to have a copy of these statements and of other statements that you will make in the near future, I shall be very grateful to be on your mailing list for such materials. Some of the materials will be directly useful in my teaching of a course in ethics, and the rest will be interesting and morale-boosting for me to have personally.

Thank you. With all good wishes, I am,

Sincerely yours,

HARRIS D. ERICKSON,
Professor of Philosophy.

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PITTSBURGH, PA.
August 5, 1964.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: Were your remarks regarding the situation in south Asia extended into the RECORD? If so I would appreciate a copy.

At least there some Senators who are concerned about sending our boys to war.

Sincerely yours,
RICHARD J. WAGNER.

PITTSBURGH, PA.

BURLINGTON, VT.
August 5, 1964.

WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senator,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Congratulations on all your past speeches on the errors of our foreign policy in southeast Asia. All our citizens owe you a debt today for the courageous way in which you expressed the "nagging doubts" which many of us feel over President Johnson's decision to attack military installations in North Vietnam when our fleet was in no immediate danger. I would like very much to have copies of any of your speeches on this topic which may be available. Keep up the good work.

Sincerely yours,
THOMAS J. SPINNER, JR.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

August 5, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I fully agree with your position on refusal to agree with the resolution on engagement in North Vietnam. The parents of all children should be grateful that there is at least one Senator who can expose the onesided argument of President Johnson to engage in aggressive war.

Please send me your entire speeches on this vital issue before the Senate now. What can the people do when all the news media are controlled? Even the proceedings of the U.N. weren't carried in its entirety here in Los Angeles. What can be done to make these channels open to the public?

Yours truly,

JOSEPH SIEGEL.

MISADVENTURE IN VIETNAM

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "Misadventure in Vietnam: The Mix of Fact and Myth," written by John Gange, and published in Nation magazine for August 24, 1964.

John Gange is director of the Institute of International Studies and Overseas Administration, of the University of Oregon. He served for some years as an officer in the State Department. I am proud to ask unanimous consent that this scholarly article by an outstanding professor at the University of Oregon be printed in the RECORD. His scholarship has won for him a high reputation.

If one will read Mr. Gange's article, entitled "Misadventure in Vietnam: The Mix of Fact and Myth," he will find further substantiation of the criticisms of U.S. warmaking policies in Asia that the junior Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRENING] and the senior Senator from Oregon have been presenting on the floor of the Senate for the past 6 months. They will find ample support for the position of the Senator from Alaska and the Senator from Oregon in refusing to vote for a joint resolution which, as we said at the time, constitutes a predicated declaration of war, giving to the President, in clear

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violation of the Constitution, the right to make war in the absence of a declaration of war.

I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a second article published in the Nation magazine for August 24, 1964, this one entitled "The Only War We've Got." It was written by Daniel F. Ford. Mr. Ford, a freelance journalist, has been in South Vietnam for the past 2 months on a magazine writer's grant from the Philip M. Stern Family Fund. This is the last article in a series he has written for the Nation from this most unfortunate war zone, in the creation of which the United States, since 1954, will have to assume a large share of the responsibility and burden in the pages of history.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MISADVENTURE IN VIETNAM—THE MIX OF FACT AND MYTH

(By John Gange)

The weathered headstones in the old Protestant cemetery of Portuguese Macao tell of the misadventures of many Americans in the Gulf of Tonkin and the South China Sea. In the early years of our Republic, the Americans who died in this faraway area were sailors, Yankee traders, missionaries, and visionary diplomats—like Edmund Roberts, who first sought treaties for the United States in southeast Asia, journeying to Cochinchina, Siam, and Muscat in 1832. Today, the headlines toll the death of many Americans pursuing the political interests of the United States in southeast Asia.

From small beginnings our interest in southeast Asia swelled to include a colonial empire highlighted by our half century in the Philippines. The United States blundered into empire in 1898 by defeating the weak Spanish imperialists in the Battle of Manila Bay. Now we are fighting again in the Gulf of Tonkin and in the steaming jungle of old Indochina. For many Americans today our deep involvement in southeast Asia's civil wars is as inexplicable as was our plunge into empire in the Philippines. For 14 years we have propped the French effort to keep Indochina, or have underwritten the "democratic" regimes of such as Bao Dai, Ngo Dinh Diem and the subsequent military dictators. We have stumbled into "colonial" responsibilities without corresponding authority since the defeat of France by the Vietnamese in 1954.

The dilemma we faced in mid-1954 was very different in some respects from the dilemma President McKinley faced in 1898 when he was informed that all of the Philippine Islands were ours for the taking—and holding. In 1954, there was nothing ready for the taking in Indochina—unless we were prepared to battle the well-armed, well-led and tough Vietnamese and almost certainly the colossus of Communist China. We nevertheless decided to try to hold South Vietnam against a Communist takeover.

In doing so we underestimated Communist power and the response of great numbers of the Vietnamese to Ho Chi Minh's leadership, plus the extent of Communist outside aid, especially from the Chinese. When Secretary Dulles went to the Geneva Conference of April 1954, called to discuss Korea and dispose of the pieces of the broken French empire in Indochina, reportedly he refused to look at the chief Communist Chinese delegate, Premier Chou En-lai. This news sparked one of Fletcher Knebel's best quips to the effect that the Republicans were an odd lot, for Senator Joseph R. McCarthy saw Communists where they did not exist, and Secretary Dulles couldn't see them where

they did exist. And here is a large part of our trouble: the refusal to look at facts which we dislike and hope will go away.

It has taken the French, through the voice of General de Gaulle, to tell us that no settlement of any Asian problem is possible that doesn't take Communist China fully into account. The British recognized this fact in 1950 but they have not been so blunt in asserting its validity. Americans have not dealt with a strong, unified China since 1842, when the British forced the opening of several Chinese ports to Western trade with various related privileges. In 1844, we got our treaty with China, including trading rights and extraterritorial courts for our citizens in China. This period of wars with the West marked the end of a strong China for a hundred years. It is time we now adjusted ourselves to the fact of a new China. Is this hard to accept? Indeed it is, and for a long time we will no doubt fight this gross fact of our times. Eventually, it will have to be accepted and it must henceforth be included in the ingredients that shape our Asian policy.

In 1954, we chose not to join in the final declaration of the Geneva Conference on Indochina of July 21, 1954. (The United States made a unilateral statement, however, accepting the armistice agreements.) All the other nations (United Kingdom, France, U.S.S.R., People's Republic of China, Laos, Cambodia, and the People's Republic of Vietnam [North Vietnam]) at this Conference, except the State of Vietnam (South Vietnam), accepted the agreements drawn there. South Vietnam, with our backing, refused to carry out the provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreement for elections in North and South Vietnam to form one government and instead set its course against the intent of this agreement. South Vietnam refused to permit the elections, began its military buildup, and prepared for the inevitable war of Vietnamese against Vietnamese, with both sides drawing on outside aid to maintain the fight. From here on it is the old familiar story of who first violated the accords or the intent of the accords, etc., etc. The fact that we first refused to accept them puts both the United States and South Vietnam in a dubious role—in the objective light of history—a role our Government has been diligent to gloss over. We refused to permit "free elections" in Vietnam because we were sure we would lose them.

When we found the 1954 Geneva Agreements unacceptable to us, although acceptable to the other signatory nations, we had two broad alternatives open to us. One alternative was to reject the final conclusions of the Conference, disregarding thereby the majority decision, and continue our own bilateral policy with South Vietnam. This we chose to do.

The second alternative was to seek a higher forum than the Geneva Conference nations. Resort to the United Nations through various possible approaches would have involved all who were concerned with peace and freedom, which we alleged were threatened in Indochina. The U.N. supervised an election and a plebiscite on the restoration of the monarchy in wartorn Greece in 1946. The conditions were hardly worse in all Vietnam in 1954, or even 1956, when a general election was to be held in July of that year. To those who say that a U.N.-supervised election in Vietnam would not have been acceptable to North Vietnam and Communist China, one answer is that we never tried this course of action and hence we can't say what the response might have been. Instead, we pressed for a southeast Asian military security pact, which Secretary Dulles had urged in 1954.

The Eisenhower administration had just swallowed the bitter pill of negotiating with Communist China and North Korea an armistice in the Korean war. The Republican campaign oratory of 1952 would have sounded

hollow and mocking indeed if the Dullesian trumpets of "liberation from communism" had sounded another retreat on the "rollback" front. Some prominent Republicans had wanted our fighting forces to join the Indochinese fray in early 1954, beside France, but the general in the commander in chief's chair had overruled that, as he had rejected any renewal of fighting in Korea above the 38th parallel. Nevertheless, Republican leaders knew from innumerable charges of their own what a powerful weapon the Democrats would have in our domestic politics if the Republican administration now lost Indochina. Ironically enough, as with mainland China, allegedly lost by the Democrats, the United States never had Indochina and couldn't have held it if we had tried. Therefore, another war in Asia was not a feasible political course for a U.S. administration, even one led by a five-star general.

Yet we did decide to try to hold at least part of Indochina; namely, the new State of Vietnam below the 17th parallel. And so the newest phase of Western adventure in Indochina began with that decision. We have been trying for 10 years to prove it a sound one.

In retrospect the foundations for our 1954 decision appear to be part fact and part myth—a fairly common mix in foreign as well as domestic policy decisions. The facts were that (1) southeast Asia was a recognized target of Communist subversion and possible takeover; (2) many of the native occupants of the Indochinese peninsula wanted no part of a future regime that might be dominated by Communist-oriented leaders. For religious, economic, and political reasons many feared the kind of society they would have if Ho Chi Minh and others of his strong Communist belief became the new rulers of this war-weary part of Asia. The foreign businessmen, rubber planters, and mine operators also, of course, feared the consequences of a Communist regime.

Moreover, the United States had become so conspicuously identified with the French in their struggle against Ho Chi Minh, albeit in the name of defense against international communism, that no further action by us now would mean that we, as well as the French, had gone down to defeat in another sector of the containment periphery of militant anticommunism.

So much for three quite substantial facts: a strong Communist drive for southeast Asia; internal Indochinese anti-Communist opinion; and the posture, or "face," of the United States if no further efforts were made to "save" Indochina.

On the side of the myths that entered into our policy calculations, directly or indirectly, there was first the one, still often expressed, that it was possible to "draw a line" beyond which there would not be tolerated any expansion of Communist control. This appealing myth evokes images of a resolute U.S. cavalry stand at the pass, or "ils ne passeront" at Verdun in World War I, or a more sophisticated but still quite naive "containment of communism" concept. Thinking of communism as an ideology ought to make people chary of expounding on "drawing a line" to stop the spread of ideas. Interestingly, history provides no example of appealing ideas having been impeded effectively in their spread and adoption because of lines drawn on political maps.

The second myth that we embraced was that military action would be an acceptable substitute for basic political and social action. Again the lessons of the bitter and frustrating American experience in Nicaragua, Haiti, and Santo Domingo in the years between World Wars I and II were passed over or rejected, if ever remembered. Military force—if sufficient in amount and ruthless enough in direction—can suppress rebellions, but rarely has it produced the reforms of conditions which lead men to join the ranks

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of rebellion. We ventured to combine some economic and technical aid with military support, but the rationale for military measures has prevailed increasingly as our efforts in Indochina have persisted. The creation of SEATO in 1954 epitomizes this futile faith in military power to solve the problems of disorder in politically inchoate states desperately in need of social reform.

The third myth that we followed was the "domino" theory of the inevitable loss of all of Asia and a vital threat to our own continental security if any additional part of Asia came under Communist control. This theory was the delight of Senator William Knowland, who trumpeted it in the Senate and across the land as if it had the infallibility of Newton's law of gravity. Even President Kennedy repeated the arguments of the "domino" theory and few voices were raised to question its logic of inevitable, irresistible and sequential massive defeat once the first (additional) little domino fell against the bastions of our friends.

The domino theory overlooks the possibility of strong reaction by other nations at different points when they are confronted by new circumstances clearly threatening their security. The theory assumes that all powerful forces are on only one side, always moving outward, and it neglects the possibility of disruptive internal forces and counterforces moving against the presumed massive seismic wave set in motion by any little change of political status. It is a negative, fearful, and mechanistic view of politics and man, but for those very reasons it finds countless advocates.

So we took some facts and added some myths and came up with a decision—many times reaffirmed—to deny all southeast Asia to communism, with military aid, and we created SEATO to do the job for us. Ten years later this queasy foundation of fact and myth finds us mired very deeply and sinking in more and more. After expending many billions of dollars and sacrificing hundreds of lives in combat or related services, after twistings and turnings of CIA undercover operations, with resulting changes of leaders in some of the states, there is still no end in sight.

What could we have done that we didn't do? If it had been possible for the Republicans to have done otherwise—or for the Democrats to have altered that policy after they took over in 1961—one would like to think that they would surely have done so. The losses of American lives, the outpouring of many billions of taxpayers' dollars and the strains on our friendship with many other nations which have not seen the issues as we have seen them, would not normally be called assets to any political party seeking voter support. And so the American people have been told over and over that there were—and still are—no other alternatives but to stand on the 17th parallel (or well south of it) and fight the devils (allegedly all from the north) in the ancient battle-fields of Indochina. What we have done is intervene in a third civil war in Asia; China and Korea being the other two very costly interventions.

Until recently, too, we have lacked critical voices which, while not acting as "the devil's advocate," would at least ask if we are sure that what we are attempting is the only possible alternative acceptable to our people. Like McKinley and the Philippines, the vast majority of the American people in 1954 had only the vaguest notion of where Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam were—and they cared less. Do they even now believe these areas so vital to their welfare that every extensive and long-term involvement is all that we can consider?

In due time, probably later than would have been an optimum time for us, we will be forced to face the "unthinkable" possibility of the neutralization of all of the Indo-

Chinese peninsula. Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara repeatedly say that no thought is being given to this alternative to our present massive military aid-cum-cheers-for-Khanh as our approach to the problem. The McNamara shuttle to Saigon carries threadbare calls for "greater resolve" and warnings of "an unforeseeable end to the effort," and then the familiar and unconvincing reports of "gratifying progress" and "encouraging developments" on the westbound run back to Washington. In the meantime, the Vietcong strike villages and cities at will in South Vietnam and simultaneously detail spare forces to push their campaign in Laos. Recruits and military equipment are picked up in abundance from the South Vietnamese civilian and military forces.

"Why are we involved in southeast Asia?" "Where do we go for the next 10 years?" These are the questions that beg and receive no clear answers, other than "Carry on. What was valid in 1954 is still valid in 1964" although the Asian world has changed greatly since then. At some point—and soon perhaps—we must face up to: (1) our dubious legal position in South Vietnam, with our shooting and destroying of military forces under the thin deceit of being "advisers"; (2) the soundness of our continuing passivity toward a strong role for the U.N. in southeast Asian strife, while at the same time we have pressed for U.N. action in the internecine fighting of the Congo, Cyprus and the Middle East; (3) a new look at neutralization of "border" areas between East and West in Asia and the established examples, both satisfactory and unsatisfactory, of neutralization in Europe and elsewhere; (4) a hard review of all our interests in Asia eventually in conference with Communist China; and (5) abandoning the shibboleth of containing communism along artificial latitudes or longitudes. The truth is that the ideological appeal of Marxist doctrine and the reforms that communism often has espoused effectively appeal to many people around the world; and the spread of these ideas will not be stopped by military fiat. Nor will it help at all to continue the repeated plaintive lament of Secretary Rusk that there would be peace in Indo-China if only the North Vietnamese and the Chinese would leave their neighbors alone. If all countries would leave their neighbors alone, it would be a very different world, but it is not realistic to expect this change in our times. To expand the war would assure only another Korea or worse, with all the possibilities of a nuclear war.

Will the new year or the postelection period see us reexamine our decade of active defense in southeast Asia's Indochinese Peninsula? Perhaps not; it has become a habit to argue as we have for so long. Apparently only a Senator WAYNE MORSE can change his mind as fully as the circumstances require and still retain his following. Politics does not stop at the water's edge, but rather it governs all we do. Only a statesman above politics can change our course now. Events in Indochina may not wait for our politicians to clear the November election hurdle before they can lead our discontented people to a new and more realistic settlement in southeast Asia, and extricate us from a misadventure born of good motives based on some faulty calculations and expectations.

THE ONLY WAR WE HAVE GOT
(By Daniel F. Ford)

SAIGON, VIETNAM.—You hear the phrase everywhere. A young special forces captain, fresh from Okinawa declares, "All I want from Vietnam is the CIB" (the combat infantryman's badge, a long rifle on a blue field with a silver wreath behind it). "Hell, man, it is the only war we have got." And an earnest major in corps

headquarters says: "You will meet the bravest and best soldiers in the U.S. Army right here. This is the only war we have got, and I would rotate the whole Army through here if I could. As it is, I am told the volunteers are backed up for 4 months."

Which is one reason why we are fighting a war and losing a revolution in South Vietnam. The backbone of any army is its NCO's and company-grade officers, and it is no accident that most of the American advisers attached to the Vietnamese Army are sergeants, first lieutenants, and captains in their 20's. A man must see combat before he is truly a soldier. Our World War II veterans are middle-age desk soldiers now, and even our Korean veterans are in their 30's and passing beyond the stage where they might be leading platoons and companies in a future war. Thus there is a very human desire on the part of the U.S. Army to exploit the chaos in southeast Asia to train a new generation of combat-experienced soldiers.

Not all American servicemen in south Vietnam share this attitude. Many, probably a majority, did not want to come here, and now that they are here they would like nothing better than to go home. But the professional soldiers are positively gleeful at this chance to advance their professional status.

Professionalism is not the only reason we are overemphasizing the military's role in southeast Asia. There is also the fact that soldiers are bound to view affairs from a military standpoint, even if the results are discouraging, as they have been so far. The appointment of Gen. Maxwell Taylor as our Ambassador to South Vietnam can hardly be expected to reverse this tendency.

But even more crucial is our refusal to name the fighting here for what it is: a revolution. For a people born out of a revolution, we are strangely reluctant to recognize the symptoms in other lands. We insist that this is war—guerrilla war, limited war, counterinsurgency war, some kind of war—despite all evidence to the contrary. I have spent 2 months in South Vietnam. I have been shot at, rained on, and chewed by insects, but never have I had the feeling that I was witnessing a war. Most correspondents who go out into the field have a similar experience. Full-scale battles are such a rarity here that when one does take place, like the Do Xa operation in June, the trophies are flown to Saigon for exhibition, and mass decorations are awarded in the public squares.

I tried the notion of revolution upon several American advisers. The most common retort was: "If this isn't a war, why are they shooting at me?" I pointed out that men were being shot for civil rights activities in the States. Was that war? "But they're not using automatic weapons," was the reply, ignoring the fact that most of the Vietcong's automatic weapons have been captured from government forces.

A more sophisticated argument goes like this: Revolutions are indigenous to the country, while the fighting in South Vietnam is directed from Hanoi. This "masked aggression" theory is official Army doctrine. Quite apart from the fact that most revolutions—including our own—were assisted by foreign powers, it overlooks the evidence which suggests that even hard-core Vietcong are recruited locally. They may have been sent to North Vietnam for training, but most of them were born south of the 17th parallel. And our trust in military force is helping guarantee that this situation will continue. As long as the countryside is considered enemy territory, the Vietnamese-American campaign will generate as many Vietcong guerrillas as it kills. That is one reason why our estimate of hard-core Vietcong strength—25,000 to 30,000 men—has remained almost constant since 1961.

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In a wry echo of the headquarters major, an elderly representative of the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM is the local alias of the Agency for International Development) said to me:

"We have some of the finest soldiers in the world assigned to South Vietnam. But what does a military man know about the people? Will they talk to a soldier, knowing what they do of soldiers? No. But I am a fat old man; they talk to me. They ask me why the United States talks about democracy while it is supporting a military dictatorship. They ask me why we talk about freedom when we are taking them from their homes and herding them into strategic hamlets, like criminals. I have no answer."

"What would he do for a Western victory in South Vietnam?"

"We should cut our military advisers to the 1962 level, 5,000 or 6,000 men, and put the difference into volunteers who know the people, who want to help the people. Like the IVS workers (International Voluntary Service, similar to the Peace Corps and predating it). The people trust them. I have never heard of an IVS worker being harmed, or even threatened. Soldiers must travel in convoys here, but the IVS can go anywhere."

Quality goes down as numbers go up, but there is no doubt that several thousand young volunteers—teachers, nurses and technicians—could do far more than the same number of soldiers to bring Western ideals to South Vietnam. And they could do it far more cheaply. The Peace Corps has functioned admirably around the world without benefit of officers' clubs, post exchanges and all the other accessories that go with a U.S. Army compound.

It would be unfair to suggest that our military effort in South Vietnam is entirely confined to hunting the elusive Vietcong. The army is trying hard to adjust to the demands of revolution, by whatever name. "Civil action" is almost a cant phrase in military circles these days—there is even a new S-5 section in the Army staff organization, devoted to psychological warfare and civic action. Army engineers are digging wells and building bridges all over South Vietnam, and Special Forces is constructing a model farm near Pleiku where montagnard peasants can learn to use fertilizer and irrigation pipes. There are dedicated, inventive soldiers in every outfit, but any ex-GI knows how much of this dedication and inventiveness is destined to be smothered by the routine of army life. Whatever the U.S. military is doing now to help the Vietnamese, the same number of volunteer civilians could do far more.

Opportunities are particularly abundant in the central highlands where the montagnard population is only beginning to emerge from the dark ages. A few miles from Pleiku, the military headquarters for fully one-fourth of South Vietnam, I visited montagnard settlements which had never seen a doctor or a schoolteacher.

"Talk about people that don't have a chance," one American captain said in amazement. "What will these kids do with their lives? Why, I'll bet if you asked every one of the 400 people in this village who the premier of their country was, they wouldn't be able to tell you."

That was overstating the extent of education among the montagnards. Most of them do not know that they have a country, let alone a premier.

I asked the USOM representative in Pleiku why we did not spend more of our money for schools, instead of for armored personnel carriers. "A schoolteacher here earns 600 piasters a month—about \$6," he said. "A coolie sweeping the streets can earn 30 piasters a day. We can't recruit enough teachers to staff the schools we are building."

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So I asked him why we didn't match the teachers' salaries with an equal amount from American funds, and he could only shrug.

The highlands are an especially fertile area for such programs because they are militarily quiet. The Mekong Delta may have deteriorated too far for education, agriculture and medicine to win the countryside back from the Vietcong, and there a military solution may be the only feasible one. But the highlands are a different matter. The Vietcong operates only in small units, usually consisting of irregulars, and even the U.S. military regards two vehicles as a sufficient convoy in most areas. For this reason the highlands have the lowest priority in everything—even in the assignment of IVS and USOM workers. Yet if the military believed its own doctrine—that the revolution here is a war staged and supplied from North Vietnam—surely the opposite should be the case. The highlands are the logical infiltration route from Laos and Cambodia. If the montagnards were won over to the Vietnamese Government, the Vietcong supply line would be cut and (if the military view is correct) their war in the delta would be choked off. Whether the "masked aggression" theory is right or wrong, we are making a tragic mistake in the highlands.

More likely, the fighting in the delta would continue even if the highlands were pacified. But that is a military assessment, and our error in South Vietnam has been to think in military terms. A peaceful, prosperous central highlands would demonstrate to the rest of the nation that the Government has more to offer than the Vietcong. Victory for the West in this revolution waits upon that demonstration. If we make it, we shall win; if we do not, we deserve to lose.

I shall never forget the afternoon I watched three young men through binoculars, convinced that they were hard core Vietcong soldiers. They were strong featured and alert, dressed in black; they were cooking dinner behind a boulder about 500 yards from the spot where our strike force patrol was taking a 10-minute break. A squad had been sent out to encircle them. But the young men heard the snap and rustle of moving soldiers. They stood up, ready to flee. The American Special Forces sergeant in charge of the patrol decided to fire while he still had a target. He fired twice, aiming into a cleft in the boulder, and his buddy did the same. Then we sprinted up the hill. The three young men had fled, unharmed, leaving behind not weapons but a much-thumbed copybook of the kind used in rural schools.

The sergeant was troubled by the idea of shooting at schoolboys.

"Well, I'm glad we missed," he said. Then he brightened. "But if those guys weren't Vietcong an hour ago, they sure as hell are by now."

Things were right in his world again. He did not seem at all concerned by the likelihood that, instead of lessening the Vietcong threat, our patrol had added to it.

PROBLEMS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD an article entitled "Johnson's Problems in the Mediterranean," written by James Reston, and published in the New York Times of August 19, 1964.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JOHNSON'S PROBLEMS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON, August 18.—The rising option in the Congress to U.S. foreign military aid is vividly illustrated by the current Greek-Turkish crisis over Cyprus.

For the Congress is now confronted by the fact that the Greeks and Turks are withdrawing U.S. military equipment from the North Atlantic alliance and threatening to use these American supplies on one another.

This has put the Johnson administration in a delicate and untenable position. The President does not want to pass judgment on who is to blame for the fighting on Cyprus, but at the same time, he cannot explain to the Congress why American arms intended to maintain the peace are being diverted for possible military action on Cyprus.

From 1946 to 1963, the United States supplied military aid to Greece totaling \$1,656 million. The total for Turkey in this same period was \$2,404 million. In the fiscal year 1963, the Greek allocation was \$85,800,000 and the Turkish \$160,800,000.

THE LEGAL RESTRICTIONS

That these impressive sums should be voted for arms to bring some kind of decent order into the eastern Mediterranean and then be used in part in the bitter communal struggle in Cyprus is the sort of thing that makes the Congress balk every time the foreign aid bill comes to debate.

President Johnson has been trying quietly to bring an end to the fighting. He sent this week a curt note to President Makarios ignoring the latter's plea for more aid and advising him bluntly to cooperate with the United Nations and avoid any action that might make the bitter struggle between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots any worse than it now is.

Meanwhile, disturbed by the Turkish use of American planes and arms to attack the Greek Cypriots, he has been in personal communication with the Turkish Government to halt all military activities. The answer of both the Ankara and Athens governments was to withdraw arms from the NATO command.

This sort of thing cannot, however, go on without placing the foreign aid program of the United States in jeopardy. In fact, continued defiance of Washington's requests for a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus dispute, and constant vilification of the United States for its efforts to produce a peaceful settlement there can easily force the President to cut off aid from both Greece and Turkey.

The bilateral agreement between the United States and Turkey on the furnishing of aid is quite specific on this point. The aid is made available by Washington to help secure the freedom and independence of Turkey and the allies. The U.S. retains the right to withdraw its equipment if its arms are used in such a way as not to further the interests of the United States.

Furthermore, section 506(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 states that "Any country which hereafter uses defense articles or defense services furnished such country under this act * * * in substantial violation of the provisions of this chapter * * * shall be immediately ineligible for further assistance."

Also, the so-called Gruening amendment, to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 620(1), insists that "No assistance shall be provided under this or any other act * * * to any country which the President determines is engaging in or preparing for aggressive military efforts directed against (1) the United States, (2) any country receiving assistance under this or any other act (Cyprus is receiving assistance under the act)."

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THE TURKISH ARGUMENT

There is little doubt here that American arms have been used in the Cyprus crisis in violation of these amendments, but the administration has been hesitating to invoke the law for fear of creating an even more serious crisis within the NATO alliance.

The Turkish argument apparently is that they not only have the right to withdraw their military units and American arms from NATO but that they are using these arms legitimately in protection of their treaty rights in Cyprus.

If this argument can be sustained, however, it is all the more likely to provoke new and sterner amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act to make sure that U.S. arms cannot be used legitimately in any such adventures in the future.

In fact, it is only the preoccupation of the Congress with the presidential election and other matters in the closing days before the Democratic Nominating Convention that is keeping the Cyprus controversy from provoking another anti-foreign-aid storm on Capitol Hill.

Meanwhile, pro-Greek elements in this country, which are vocal and influential in some of the big electoral States, are beginning to demand that military aid to Turkey be cut off and withdrawn. Thus the controversy affects not only the President's relations with the Congress and the allies, but with the voters as well, and he will no doubt be forced to act unless he begins to get some kind of settlement of the dispute before long.

DOCUMENTATION OF MILITARY POWER

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, one of the most useful documents published anywhere in the world is the annual summary of military power, published by the Institute of Strategic Studies, in London. If one sought in the United States the information that is contained in this document, much of it would be marked "Secret." This bears out the point which the senior Senator from Oregon has made for many years, namely, that the American people are being given a "snow job" by their Government. Citizens are being denied access to the public business in regard to the military power of the United States. It is business which they are entitled to know.

This British document contains much military information that one cannot get from the Pentagon.

This article shows how perfectly absurd our so-called top secret policy is in the United States. It serves for the most part only to deny to the American people the facts which they should have if they are properly to judge and to appraise the unsound policies of the United States in the field of military aid and in the building up of a war machine in this country far beyond the kind of war machine we need to protect the security of the free world.

In my judgment, as I have said this annual summary of the world's military power published by the Institute of Strategic Studies in London, is one of the most useful documents published anywhere in the world.

As I did last year, I am going to have it printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, so that it will be more readily available to Americans who are interested in the facts of the world's military power.

I particularly call attention to the analysis of the military strength of Communist China. This report indicates that while China maintains an armed force of 2,476,000, it has 130 million men of military age. It also estimates that China's military power has declined over the last 5 years, and that its concentration of forces has moved away from the Taiwan Straits to China's northern and southern borders.

I also point out that the Institute estimates the size of the Soviet Army at no more than 2,300,000 and possibly only 2 million. It also describes a 25 percent downward revision of Soviet tactical air strength, and a doubling of the number of nuclear-powered submarines compared to last year.

I ask unanimous consent to have the entire publication "The Military Balance, 1963-64" printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE MILITARY BALANCE, 1963-64

FOREWORD

This is the fifth of the institute's annual estimates of the nature and size of military forces of the principal powers involved in the cold war. It covers the Communist bloc and those countries with which the United States has mutual defense treaties. This year information has also been included on a number of important nonaligned countries.

The institute assumes full responsibility for the facts and judgments which the pamphlet contains. It owes a considerable debt to a number of its own members and consultants who have cooperated in compiling and checking the material. However, not all countries have been equally cooperative in producing information and some figures have been estimated.

This pamphlet examines the military balance as it existed at the end of October 1963, and as it will, on present indications, change during the ensuing year. No longer-range projections of force levels or weapons beyond 1964 have been included.

The material in this pamphlet should not be regarded as a comprehensive guide to the nature of the balance of strategic power: it does not reflect the facts of geography, vulnerability, efficiency, etc., on both sides. It may, however, be found useful in the context of discussions on disarmament and the general balance of power.

Note on the figures

Manpower figures given are those of regular forces, although an indication of the size of paramilitary forces, militia or reserve forces, has been given in the sections dealing with individual countries. Naval strengths are those of active fleets and ships in commission only, except where otherwise stated. All vessels of less than 100 tons standard displacement have been excluded. Fighting ships below 400 tons have been classed as light coastal units. Figures for defense budgets are exclusive of American military aid. Fighter and strike squadrons of allied air forces have 25 aircraft and wings have 75 aircraft, except where otherwise stated.

PART I THE COMMUNIST POWERS

The Soviet Union, population: 225 million

The main lines of Soviet defense policy in 1963 have changed little from those of the preceding 2 years. The slow buildup of the strategic deterrent force of ICBM's is continuing. Soviet policy still lays stress on high-yield warheads for the small number of missiles available. It would appear that the deployment of MRBM's is now complete.

The procurement of the longer range IRBM's, of the type which were first publicly known to be operational when launching pads for them were built in Cuba in 1962, is probably continuing.

Defense expenditure has increased slightly. This is probably due to the demands of research and development, and to some extent of the modernization of the armed forces. It is notable that the U.S.S.R. is continuing the procurement of medium-range supersonic bombers which are clearly expected to continue in service for the foreseeable future. Though the Soviet Union has a force of fleet ballistic missiles, it is doubtful whether Soviet claims to have developed a true equivalent to the American Polaris submarines can yet be taken literally.

But although the main lines of Soviet policy are unchanged, there have been a number of developments which indicate changes of emphasis, and to some extent of force levels. In the spring of 1963, the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Zakharov, was replaced by Marshal Biryuzov who had previously held the key posts of chief of Soviet air defense from 1958-62 and commander of the strategic rocket forces from 1962-63. The increasing influence of officers with a scientific background which this indicated is likely to continue. Marshal Malinovsky, the Defense Minister, may be the last of the generation of military commanders whose authority arises from the part they played in the Second World War. It should, however, be noted that the book "Military Strategy," edited by Marshal Sokolovsky, has been criticized in the Soviet Union over the past year, not only for ignoring the importance of scientific developments in determining military strategy, but also for paying no attention to the political and ideological factors in maintaining morale and military efficiency. The debate between traditional military leaders and younger technocrats will doubtless continue in the years ahead. From the Soviet viewpoint the most noticeable feature of the Sokolovsky book was perhaps the fact that for the first time it presented an accurate picture to the Russian public of the strategic strength of the United States. The book has been criticized for ignoring the possible circumstances in which nuclear weapons could not be used if war broke out: the significance of this criticism may be revealed when the revised edition of the book appears later this year.

The test ban treaty is unlikely to inhibit Soviet development and advance in the one field where Soviet prowess is apparently inferior to that of the United States—very low yield nuclear weapons. Official doctrine has, however, laid little stress on these in the past. The treaty may inhibit the antiballistic missile program, but it would appear that the Soviet Union has resigned itself to a period without any effective defense against missiles, and believes that the same will be true of the United States. This resignation seems to be a part of the general Soviet approach to the present strategic confrontation: it appears that the Soviet authorities are debating future policy in terms of their own resources and of the current strategic controversies within NATO before they decide whether any large reorientation of their own policy is necessary.

Meanwhile the Sino-Soviet dispute provides a complicating factor. Apart from 17 Soviet divisions in the Far East, troops already in central Asia, and a few detachments beyond Lake Balkal, the Soviet Union has no military formations, other than border guards, along its border with China. There is unlikely to be any shift of forces from Europe or European Russia, but there might be military pressure for a reactivation of the cadre divisions in the Soviet Union, and a reorganization of naval and air defense. It is doubtful whether this policy will be put into effect. In European Rus-